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BLACK HOLE APPARITIONS
LISA BERNSTEIN†
INTRODUCTION
In their article The Black Hole Problem in Commercial Boilerplate1
and its companion pieces,2 Stephen Choi, Mitu Gulati, and Robert Scott
[hereinafter “CG&S”] introduce and explore the concept of “contractual
black holes,” boilerplate contract provisions that have been “emptied of any
recordable meaning”3 through rote repetition,4 the introduction of
essentially “random variations in language,”5 and the absence of “any
validation [of their meaning] from courts or industry institutions.”6 The
article presents a detailed case study of the sovereign debt market’s slow
response to the Second Circuit’s errant interpretation of the pari passu
clause at issue in NML v. Argentina,7 a common clause in sovereign debt
† Wilson-Dickenson Professor of Law and Aaron Director Research Scholar, The University of
Chicago Law School, and International Research Fellow, Center for Corporate Reputation, Said School
of Business, University of Oxford. I would like to thank Douglas Baird, Patrick Barry, Edward
Bernstein, Brian Bix, Sadie Blanchard, Robin Effron, Roger Ford, Anna Gelpern, William Hubbard,
Todd Ito, Avery Katz, Kate Lindgren, Bill Schwesig, and Mark Ramseyer, Steve Ware, and participants
at the Duke Conference on Contractual Black Holes (2017) for helpful conversations. Special thanks are
due to the hole theorists themselves for engaging conversations about their piece over the past year.
1. Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott, The Black Hole Problem in Commercial
Boilerplate, 67 DUKE L.J. 1 (2017).
2. The other two papers in the Black Hole corpus are Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, & Robert E.
Scott, Contractual Arbitrage, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE (Eric
Brosseau,
Jean-Michel
Galmant
&
Jerome
Sgaard
eds.,
forthcoming
2017)
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=6304&context=faculty_scholarship
[https://perma.cc/VC3Y-QLKN] and Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott, Variation in
Boilerplate: Rational Design or Random Mutation, 19 AM. L. & ECON. REV. (forthcoming 2017)
[hereinafter, Choi et al., Variation in Boilerplate].
3. Choi et al., supra note 1, at 2.
4. Id. at 6.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 257 (2d Cir. 2012). The black hole
corpus also focuses on an earlier interpretation of the pari passu clause rendered by a Brussels court in

Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3086842
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3086842

SSRN HOLES.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

BLACK HOLE APPARITIONS

12/12/17 3:43 PM

103

contracts that they view as the “prototypical exemplar”8 of a black hole.
Noting that the NML decision put a multi-trillion dollar market at risk by
making it more difficult to restructure sovereign debt,9 and that it took
years for market transactors to draft clauses eliminating the problem,10 the
authors conclude that changes in contract doctrine are needed to deal with
the problems caused by black holes. As they explain, “while black holes
often remain for many years as relatively harmless surplusage, they can
[also] generate substantial social costs once litigation results in an
interpretation that introduces inefficiencies into the market.”11
This Comment focuses on the authors’ proposed doctrinal solution to
the black hole problem, which seeks to eliminate any inquiry into
“subjective intent” when courts are faced with the task of interpreting a
black hole. It explores the conceptual and practical challenges of
implementing the authors’ proposal and then questions whether legal
reform is really needed to deal with the black hole problem. Part I identifies
several common ways that standardized contract provisions that are often
indistinguishable from true black holes may arise.12 It suggests that any
doctrinal solution to the black hole problem will have to either reliably
distinguish real black holes from these relatively common “black hole
apparitions,” or be desirable when applied to both types of provisions. Part
II describes the proposed reform and explores the practical barriers to
implementing it. Along the way it also sketches out several alternative
avenues for solving the problems evidenced in the pari passu saga. It
suggests that these avenues, while more limited in scope than the authors’
proposed reform, may turn out to be more feasible and less costly to

2000. See Elliott Assocs. v. Republic of Peru, 948 F. Supp. 1203 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
8. Choi et al., supra note 1, at 7.
9. Interestingly, the Second Circuit seemed to reject the idea that it was jeopardizing the market
as a whole by making restructuring more difficult. See NML Capital, Ltd., 699 F.3d at 263 (explaining
why this effect is unlikely to occur.)
10. Choi et al., supra note 1, at 70 (concluding that “the inherently greater inertia costs [and social
costs] that result from an aberrant interpretation of a black hole term,” as compared to an ordinary
unclear term, and the “greater difficulty market players face in overcoming the resulting collective
action problem[s]” slow the adoption of new and better contractual terms).
11. Id.
12. Although it is possible that some of the types of clauses this Comment views as “black hole
apparitions” would be classified as genuine black holes by CG&S, their search for additional examples
of black holes by holding a conference on the subject at Duke Law School suggests that these
ubiquitous types of clauses with uncertain meaning are unlikely to come within the purview of their
definition. As Gulati explained, “black holes where meaning has been lost are different from provisions
where there is a general sense of what they mean, but there is some vagueness or lack of clarity.” Email from Mitu Gulati, Professor of Law, Duke University, to author (Sept. 23, 2017) (on file with
author).
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implement. Part III questions whether any doctrinal or other solution to the
so-called black hole problem can be justified on the basis of the lessons
learned from the pari passu saga alone, given that other markets have been
able to overcome collective action problems and adopt and amend
standard-form contracts through processes that have tended to work more
quickly and less contentiously over time. Finally, Part IV concludes by
suggesting that the interpretive approach adopted by the Second Circuit in
NML might be a passably good response to the black hole problem writ
large.
I. A TYPOLOGY OF BLACK HOLE APPARITIONS
CG&S suggest that contract doctrine should treat the interpretation of
black holes differently from the interpretation of other unclear or
essentially meaningless contractual provisions. Yet both conceptually and
practically, it may be extraordinarily difficult to distinguish true black holes
from what might be called “black hole apparitions.” Black hole apparitions
are contract provisions that are indistinguishable on their face from black
holes yet will not necessarily give rise to the drafting inertia and social
costs that led CG&S to conclude that a doctrinal response to the black hole
phenomenon was needed. Recognizing the existence of these apparitions
suggests that any doctrinal reform that turns on a provision’s status as a
black hole will,13 in practice, bring many black hole apparitions into its
orbit. As a consequence, any such change is likely to add significant costs
to ordinary commercial litigation and create and/or exacerbate
opportunities for strategic behavior. Against this background, and to
understand how common these apparitions are likely to be, it is useful to
look more closely at three common types of black hole apparitions, those
whose origins are procedural, relational or rational.
A. Procedural Apparitions
One category of black hole apparitions is what might be termed
procedural apparitions— contract provisions that are at a high risk of
losing their meaning due to state-supplied procedural rules or transactors’
procedure-related drafting choices.
For example, black holes are especially likely to arise in markets
13. In order for a doctrine that conditions on whether a clause is or is not a black hole to be
workable, a clause’s status must be verifiable by a court—that is, a court must be able to determine with
reasonable accuracy at a cost the transactors consider reasonable from an ex ante perspective whether or
not something is a black hole. See generally Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts and the Courts: An
Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271 (1992).
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where most contracts provide for arbitration under the American
Arbitration Association’s (AAA) Commercial Arbitration Rules.14
Although it is increasingly common for AAA arbitrators to produce
reasoned opinions rather than mere awards,15 these opinions are typically
kept private and are of no precedential value.16 As a consequence, the terms
of these contracts (whether standard or bespoke) are correspondingly less
likely to be interpreted in written opinions with precedential value and are
at a heightened risk of gradually losing their meaning over time. The
routine inclusion of a AAA arbitration clause, therefore, increases the risk
that some of an agreement’s provisions will devolve into black hole
apparitions.17
Similarly, the standards of appellate review and the fact that most state

14. COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES (Am. Arbitration Ass’n
2013), https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Commercial%20Rules.pdf. [https://perma.cc/E8EWCBBP].
15. The AAA discourages written opinions but permits parties to request them. See CHARLES A.
COOPER, HARRY KAMINSKY & NEIL CARMICHAEL, MANUAL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 162
(Am. Arbitration Ass’n 1999) (“Currently in domestic arbitrations, the AAA does not encourage
commercial arbitrators to write opinions which give their reasons for the award. However, in instances
where both parties request an opinion prior to the appointment of the arbitrator, the arbitrator should
comply.”). While transactors might opt to revise a clause in face of a seemingly aberrant arbitration
ruling, they might also surmise, much as the sovereign debt community did after the ruling of the
Brussels court, that a more sensible panel (or as in the case of the pari passu clause the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals) would rule differently. See Choi et al., supra note 1, at 12.
16. But see generally W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Toward a Theory of Precedent in Arbitration, 51
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1895 (2010) (suggesting that in some contexts arbitration decisions that are not
technically precedent nevertheless have an effect on the outcome of future disputes). In addition, there
are indications that companies fear that arbitral decisions will be given some weight if they have future
disputes with the same counter-party. For example, Verizon’s consumer agreement provides for AAA
commercial arbitration, includes a class action waiver, and also contains a clause stating that “[a]n
arbitration award and any judgment confirming it apply only to that specific case; it can’t be used in any
other case except to enforce the award itself.” Customer Agreement, VERIZON WIRELESS (Oct. 20,
2017), https://www.verizonwireless.com/legal/notices/customer-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/3A2L6YGT]; see also What’s Going on? Arbitration Explanation, WASTE MGMT.,
http://mediaroom.wm.com/legal-notice/ [https://perma.cc/TZ3C-X4GB] (“The award of the arbitrator
may be entered and enforced in any court having jurisdiction. An arbitration award and any judgment
confirming it apply only to that specific case; it cannot be used in any other case except to enforce the
arbitration award itself.”).
17. For example, trade association-run private legal systems are designed in ways that will
strongly discourage the emergence of black holes. At the National Grain and Feed Association, for
example, arbitrators write reasoned opinions that are posted on the association’s website. When a rule is
unclear, or appears to lead to an undesirable or unanticipated result, the arbitrators will state this
explicitly, apply the rule as it is stated, and note that the association’s rules committee should consider
revising the rule, something that is typically done. See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant
Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1780 &
nn.50–51 (1996).
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and many federal trial courts do not routinely publish opinions18 might also
play a role in the emergence of some types of contractual black holes. The
vast majority of appellate courts provide greater deference to lower-court
decisions on question of fact than on questions of law, or in some
jurisdictions, mixed questions of law and fact. As a consequence, the
meaning of standard-like provisions that are interpreted using a highly factspecific inquiry is less likely to be appealed than the meaning of rule-like
provisions whose interpretation is more often considered a matter of law.
Standard-like provisions are correspondingly less likely to be interpreted in
a written opinion of any kind. They are therefore more likely than rule-like
provisions to devolve into meaningless provisions that look like classic
black holes.19
B. Relational Apparitions
A second type of black hole apparition, which might be called a
relational apparition, is particularly likely to emerge: (1) where there is a
written or standard-form template that is used in most deals in a particular
market; or (2) where seemingly bespoke contracts are used,20 but those who
negotiate them (either the business people or the contract lawyers) share a
rough but deeply ingrained understanding about the types and content of
terms that are commonly included in such agreements. In both of these
situations, transactors may be especially hesitant to propose changes to
commonly used terms. When a transactor proposes a change in the usual
way of doing things, even when that usual way is not terribly important or
when the variant creates value for both transactors, her counter-party might
well interpret it as a signal that she is either more likely to engage in
strategic behavior or more focused on her legal rights than the average
18. STEVEN M. BARKEN, BARBARA A. BINTLIFF & MARY WHISNER, FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL
RESEARCH 41 (10th ed. 2015) (“Ordinarily, cases decided by state trial courts are not reported. . . . Only
a few states, such as New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, publish some trial court opinions,
but those selected are few in number and represent only a very small portion of the total cases heard by
trial courts.”). A similar problem may exist with respect to cases decided in federal court. See David A.
Hoffman, Alan J. Izenman & Jeffrey R. Lidicker, Docketology, District Courts, and Doctrine, 85
WASH. U. L. REV. 681, 727 (2007) (“[S]tarkly expos[ing] how little trial court work is explained
through written opinions.”).
19. It is, however, possible that the doctrinal contours of the black hole or no black hole
determination would become clearer over time because under the proposed change this would be
determined as a “matter of law.” See Choi et al., supra note 1, at 68.
20. CG&S focus mostly on standard commercial provisions in standardized contracts. However,
both black holes and black hole apparitions can arise in seemingly bespoke contracts as well. To the
extent this phenomenon exists, the proposed reform, in as much as it seems to apply only to standard
contracts with boilerplate provision, would be underinclusive with respect to the types of holes found in
these seemingly bespoke agreements.
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transactor. The counter-party might therefore ask for protective changes in
response. This, in turn, might trigger a cascade of change requests that
could greatly increase contracting costs, reduce the likelihood of postsigning cooperation,21 or destroy the deal completely.22 As long as
transactors are aware of or intuit this dynamic, they might be reluctant to
propose changing or eliminating common provisions, even if these
provisions appear to be meaningless or irrelevant and standardization,
across either the market as a whole or particular subsets of market
participants, has no independent value.
Relational black hole apparitions may also be common in markets
where transactors trust one another or where the force of reputation-based
network governance is strong. In some markets where genuine
interpersonal trust is present, it remains common for transactors to put the
contract in the drawer. As a consequence, transactors will likely spend little
or no time negotiating its terms. In these situations, contract language is
quite likely to be unthinkingly recycled.23 Similarly, in markets where
transactors rely on reputation-based network governance to support
exchange, using similar contracts across the market makes these reputationbased forces stronger.24 When contracts are relatively standardized and/or
there is widespread consensus about what constitutes cooperation and
good-faith behavior,25 the network need only transmit information about
21. The way that a contract is negotiated has an effect on how well the business deal can be
operationalized once the contract is signed. See Danny Ertel, Getting Past Yes: Negotiating as if
Implementation Mattered, 85 HARV. BUS. REV. 60, 62 (2004).
22. For a more complete discussion of this bargaining dynamic and the way that it effects the
terms of agreements, see generally Lisa Bernstein, Social Norms & Default Rules Analysis, 3 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 59 (1993).
23. Gillian K. Hadfield & Iva Bozovic, Scaffolding: Using Formal Contracts To Build Informal
Relations to Support Innovation, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 981, 982, 987 (noting that Stewart Macaulay’s
finding that in commercial contracting relationships problems tended to be worked out informally and
“written contracts . . . were often highly-standardized documents that were often confined to the
drawer,” held in a modern day sample of non-innovative firms where informal methods of dispute
resolution remained common and firms either “did not generate [formal contracts] or relied only on
standardized documents,” but did not hold in a sample of innovative firms).
24. See generally Lisa Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts: Social Capital and Network
Governance in Procurement Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 561 (2015) (explaining how widely
known and standardized contract provisions may affect the strength of network governance).
25. In some markets where reputation-based network governance plays an important role in
contracting, some large companies post their quality requirements and their standard terms and
conditions on their website so that the contours of what is and is not expected from their counterparties
is known throughout the market. See, e.g., Supplier Quality Manual, JOHN DEERE,
https://jdsn.deere.com/wps/portal/jdsn/Applications?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/wps/wcm/connect/
jdsn_website/jdsn/business+processes/quality/supplier_quality_manual/supplier_quality_manual_index
[https://perma.cc/57SG-BQUK]; Terms and Conditions for the Purchase of Goods and Services, JOHN
DEERE,
https://www.johndeerestore.com/jdb2cstorefront/JohnDeereStore/en/terms
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how a transactor behaved in order for other market participants to assess
the desirability of dealing with him. In contrast, when contracts are more
varied, information about both the scope of the relevant obligations and
actual behavior may need to be transmitted through the relevant network in
order for reputation to play an important role in governing exchange—a
process that is bound to be more expensive, less effective, and more error
prone than in markets where relatively standard agreements are used.26
Since lawsuits are less common in markets where genuine trust is present
or network governance is operational, fewer terms in commercial contracts
are likely to be interpreted by courts and both black holes and black hole
apparitions are correspondingly more likely to arise.
C. Rational Apparitions
A third and final type of black hole apparition, and one that may also
emerge in both standard-form and bespoke contracts, is a rational black
hole. A rational black hole is a term that is left deliberately vague or
without meaning at the time of contracting.27 The economic literature has
identified a variety of reasons that the inclusion of such terms might be
rational.28 Among them: transactors believe that they will be better able to
devise a response to a contingency when it actually arises, since additional
facts about its implications will be known; transactors conclude that the
probability a contingency will arise is so low (or the variety of related
contingencies is so large) that it is not worth dealing with any or all of them
[https://perma.cc/B7DH-QPQU].
26. In such markets, general and impressionistic information about whether a transactor behaved
properly or poorly could still be easily transmitted, but in the absence of standard terms, a consensus
about what constitutes good behavior, or information about both what was promised and what was
done, this information is likely to be given less weight (especially when it travels more than one step
from its source) than information that circulates in markets where contracts and/or expectations are
either relatively standardized or widely known. Bernstein, supra note 24, at 578–89 (discussing how
John Deere achieves this).
27. Sometimes the line between relational and rational black holes may be blurry. For example,
Scott and Triantis note that it is often economically rational to use very standard-like terms like “good
faith,” “reasonable efforts,” or “best efforts,” and leave it for the court to give these terms meaning ex
post. Robert E. Scott & George Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814,
835 (2006). However, once those terms become common in an industry’s contracts (or between a pair
of long-term repeat dealers), their presence in contracts may be exceptionally sticky. If, for example,
someone sends their counterparty a draft obligating the counterparty (and themselves) to act in good
faith, the relational costs of saying to one’s counter party, “well let’s spell that out” or “let’s leave that
out” might be high.
28. For a discussion of rational reasons why many clauses are left vague or undefined, see Scott &
Triantis, supra note 27, at 814–15. The literature conceptualizes these terms as agreements-to-agree or
agreements to determine meaning of a term through negotiation or litigation if an interpretive dispute
arises.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3086842

SSRN HOLES.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

12/12/17 3:43 PM

BLACK HOLE APPARITIONS

109

ex ante; and finally, transactors have divergent views of the bargaining
power they will each have when and if the issue arises, leading each to
favor dealing with it later. In addition, in some contexts, clauses may be
left meaningless or vague simply because transactors realize that in the
event of a dispute over the meaning of the clause, the aggrieved party is
unlikely to have a credible threat to sue for any of a number of reasons,
including: litigation costs, the reputational cost of litigation, the
information they would have to divulge in discovery,29 or the fact that
litigation would likely end their otherwise valuable contracting
relationship. 30
D. Conclusion
In sum, the existence of black hole apparitions complicates any
attempt to deal with the black hole problem through changes in general
contract doctrine that are contingent on a term’s status as a black hole.31
There are likely to be many contexts where black holes cannot be
distinguished from black hole apparitions. In addition, depending on
precisely how a black hole is defined, there are likely to be some instances
where black holes exist yet the type of redrafting inertia that beset the
sovereign debt market is unlikely to arise since the need for the type of
market wide uniformity that is desirable when contracts are akin to
financial instruments will not exist. As a consequence, any reform that
conditions on a clause’s status as a black hole and applies to commercial
contracts generally is likely to be overinclusive. By bringing commercial
contracts dealing with the routine purchase and sale of goods and provision

29. For a complete discussion of the ways that transactors’ “secrecy interest” in certain types of
business information may affect the credibility of their threat to sue in a variety of contexts, see
generally Omri Ben Shahar & Lisa Bernstein, The Secrecy Interest in Contract Law, 109 YALE L.J.
1885 (2000).
30. In contracting relationships like those between an Original Equipment Manufacturer and its
suppliers of component parts where a lawsuit tends to end the parties contracting relationship, many
contractual provisions that are formally enforceable may not operate in the shadow of the law at all. The
reason is simple: if one of these provisions were breached in isolation, the promisee would not have a
credible threat to sue since the expected recovery would be very unlikely to exceed the future value of
the relationship as a whole. These “interior contract provisions” operate outside of the shadow of the
law, unless and until they are breached in combination with enough other provisions that the
counterparty concludes that there has been a breach of the contracting relationship that makes it
worthwhile to end the transactors’ business relationship and sue. See Bernstein, supra note 24, at 570–
71.
31. At one point in their analysis CG&S hint that it might be desirable to apply a knock-out rule to
black hole terms akin to the rule adopted by some courts applying U.C.C. § 2-207. However, this rule
will also require black holes to be identified by courts and will therefore be unworkable for many of the
same reasons discussed herein.
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of services within its purview, any such reforms will increase litigation
costs and create substantial social and private costs of their own.
Indeed, the pari passu black hole itself can be understood as arising
from a mix of the procedural, relational, and rational considerations that
give rise to black hole apparitions. The pari passu is partly a procedural
black hole. Historically, the law of sovereign immunity made it
extraordinarily difficult to sue or collect judgments32 from other nations.33
Although in recent years it has become easier to sue a sovereign,34 many
collection barriers remain. These legal and procedural barriers may be one
reason why prior to a Brussels court’s 2000 decision in Elliott Associates v.
Republic of Peru,35 there were no contemporary judicial decisions
interpreting the meaning of pari passu provisions. The rote inclusion of the
pari passu clause and the market’s slow reaction to the NML decision36 can
also be understood as the product of relational costs. As CG&S point out,
as long as rating agencies did not downgrade bonds because the pari passu
clause remained unchanged, individual issuers were wary of changing the
clause and potentially triggering a negative rating-agency response.37
Finally, market players’ failure to revise the pari passu clause after the
aberrant court judgments may or may not have been rational.38 However,
the decision not to attend to its meaning more precisely at the time
indentures were drafted may have been rational. After all, if the clause had

32. See Sadie Blanchard, Courts Without Enforcement: Adjudicating Reputation in the Sovereign
Debt Market 6–7 (Oct. 27, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (concluding that “[e]ven though [the holders
of sovereign debt] cannot enforce debtor states’ obligations through conventional judicial means, courts
play a key role in the sovereign debt market . . . because they provide information that has the power to
provoke reactions by third parties that are costly for the debtor or its agents,” so that “[c]reditors litigate
because producing such information through the courts strengthens their leverage in settlement
negotiations,” and makes reputation a more powerful force in the market).
33. See Julian Schumacher, Christoph Trebesch & Henrik Enderlein, Sovereign Defaults in Court
10–11 (May 6, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=2189997 [https://perma.cc/T2Q7-LNGN], (finding that only 5 percent of sovereign defaults resulted in
litigation until the 2000s, when the proportion rose to nearly half).
34. See W. Mark C. Weidermaier, Sovereign Immunity and Sovereign Debt, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV.
67, 68–70 (2014).
35. Cours d’Appel de Bruxelles, 8th Chamber, 2000/QR/92, Elliott Assocs. v. République de
Peru, 2000/QR/92, Sept. 26, 2000.
36. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 257 (2d Cir. 2012). The black hole
corpus also looks at the market’s nonresponse to a pari passu decisions of a Brussels court, but
attributes it to market players’ beliefs that other, more important courts for the sovereign debt
community would not follow such an aberrant decision.
37. Choi et al., supra note 1, at 49.
38. As CG&S point out, it might not have been individually rational for any one issuer to make
these changes to their past and future indentures, even though it would have been rational for the market
as a whole to move to a different term. Id. at 13.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3086842

SSRN HOLES.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

12/12/17 3:43 PM

BLACK HOLE APPARITIONS

111

not been interpreted in court for such a long period, the expected benefit of
tinkering with it in a purposeful way might properly have been seen as
small. Together, these considerations suggest that even on a purely
conceptual level the line between a contract provision whose meaning has
been eroded as a result of procedural, relational, and rational considerations
and a true black hole is quite difficult to demarcate with analytic precision.
II. THE PROPOSED DOCTRINAL RESPONSE
CG&S acknowledge that at present we have only a limited
understanding about the frequency of black holes and the contexts in which
courts’ erroneous interpretations of widely used terms will be met with
drafting inertia. Nevertheless, they conclude that immediate legal reform to
deal with the black hole problem is needed. In their view, the “vexing
collective action problems” that market participants face when attempting
to respond to errant court interpretations are so significant that the potential
social costs of not dealing with the black hole problem are too significant
to ignore.39
CG&S suggest that the best doctrinal way to deal with the black hole
problem is for courts interpreting “boilerplate terms in commercial
contracts”40 to be “open to arguments that as a matter of law, the clause in
question has been emptied of meaning and functions as a black hole in
boilerplate.”41 In cases in which the parties meet the burden of establishing
the existence of a black hole, the court would then be required to adopt an
interpretive approach that avoids any inquiry into subjective intent and
looks to other interpretive principles to decide the case.42 Under the
proposed approach, the hole or non-hole determination would turn on a
variety of highly fact-specific considerations and types of evidence. These
include the types of evidence adduced in the pari passu case study,43 as
well as the types of information needed to answer the following questions:
Has the clause been repeated by rote over many years, without having
been tested in litigation, where repetition has robbed the term of any
obvious conventional meaning? Has the term been embedded in layers of
39. Id. at 37 (“We use both qualitative and quantitative data to support the claim that courts
searching for shared intent in the case of black holes in standardized contracting can result in substantial
social costs.”).
40. Id. at 67.
41. Id. at 68.
42. See id. at 66–67, 69 Exactly what this alternative interpretive approach would be is not
specified in great detail. See id. at 54–56. If, instead, some form of knock-out rule were contemplated,
similar problems would arise. See supra note 31.
43. Choi et al., supra note 1, at 38.
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legal jargon such that its intelligibility is substantially reduced and
variations in the formulation of the term across contracts have no apparent
significance? Is a historic or original meaning of the term accessible in a
fashion that makes sense in the contemporary context and are
contemporary commercial actors aware of that meaning? Is there credible
evidence that the particular provision was priced at the original issue
stage?44

Notwithstanding its theoretical appeal, the implementation of this approach
faces significant practical challenges. First, the test will be widely
overinclusive even with respect to standard provisions in standard-form
contracts because answers to these questions will not reliably distinguish
black holes from black hole apparitions.45 Moreover, because the new test
applies to all standard commercial agreements, it gives a significant
advantage to the party with deeper pockets who might claim a black hole
exists simply to increase putative litigation costs and thereby lever a better
settlement.
Second, and relatedly, as CG&S themselves acknowledge, introducing
this inquiry would open the door to moral hazard and other types of
strategic behavior.46 Although they suggest that moral hazard can be
adequately dealt with by adopting “an initial presumption against the
existence of a black hole,”47 even if they are correct the risk of strategic
behavior will remain substantial.
Third, even abstracting from overinclusiveness and strategic behavior,
as a practical matter the type of information CG&S view as relevant to the
black hole or non-black hole determination, will often be either unavailable
to the parties or prohibitively costly to obtain.48 For example, in contexts
where the relevant contracts are not disclosed under the securities laws,
transactors’ reluctance to share this information will make it impossible to
get the contracts used in similar transactions—an evidentiary problem that
will prevent courts from answering many of the questions that CG&S view
as directly relevant to the hole or no-hole determination. Similarly, there is
no obvious way to determine whether a particular clause has been priced

44. Id. at 68.
45. Indeed, the methodology CG&S used to reach the conclusion that the pari passu provision
was a black hole, rather than an efficient contract term, relied on extensive information about the
market’s response to the decision over a period of years. See id. at 11.
46. The types of strategic behavior it would introduce are analogous to those identified in Alan
Schwartz and Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 587
(2000) and Lisa Bernstein, Custom in the Courts, 110 NW. L. REV. 63, 106–08 (2015).
47. Choi et al., supra note 1, at 68.
48. Id. at 55–56, 64.
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into a contract. In many settings, price and other terms are negotiated
separately, and even when they are not, determining the connection
between price and a particular term may be difficult either because the
transactors did not explicitly think about the connection or because
reconstructing the sequence of a negotiation from the testimony of
witnesses with conflicting agendas is likely to be an error-fraught process.
In addition, market players, even those who willingly spoke to academics,
might be reluctant to talk to litigators or testify in court. Thus, even if in
theory the hole or no-hole determination could be accurately made on the
basis of the types of evidence that CG&S view as relevant, in practice
much of this information is likely to be either prohibitively expensive or
entirely unavailable.
Fourth, while CG&S want the courts to intervene when “parties
exploit” either the absence of meaning or the presence of “random
variations in language [to advance] an interpretation the market
disavows,”49 they offer little guidance on how random variants can be
distinguished from what they call “rational design,”50 a determination that
would likely create both evidentiary problems and additional interpretive
uncertainty.51
Finally, without a more detailed description of the interpretive rule
that the court would apply when a hole is found and a better sense of the
extent to which the chosen rule would result in predictable outcomes, it is
difficult to asses how frequently the disputing parties will have the proper
incentives to take advantage of the proposed reform and argue that black
holes exist, even in contexts where they both believe that a true black hole
actually exists.
Consider, for example, a context in which both parties think that the
best subjective interpretation of a clause that they can advance is better
than the expected interpretation they think a court would give the clause if
a black hole were found to exist.52 In such a situation, both parties might
opt not to argue for a hole’s existence even if they both genuinely believe
49. Id. at 1.
50. Choi et al., Variation in Boilerplate, supra note 2, at 4.
51. CG&S undertake just this inquiry in another part of the black hole corpus. See id. at 6. There,
the authors seek to demonstrate that the observed variations in the pari passu clauses used in sovereign
debt contracts are the result of random mutation rather than rational design. The information and
analysis they present is a good proxy for how difficult it would be for a transactor to litigate this
distinction in court. Moreover, not all of the information they refer to could be known at trial—for
example, how the market would respond if the court gave weight to a small drafting difference.
52. When real black holes actually exist, parties are likely to be largely unconstrained with respect
to the range of plausible subjective intents they can proffer. As a consequence, the assumptions made in
the text are likely to characterize a meaningful subset of the cases that might arise.
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that a hole exists. To see why, consider a plaintiff who is trying to decide
whether to plead that a hole exists or to advance her own subjective
interpretation of a clause. If she pleads that a hole exists, the defendant
faces a strategic choice. If he pleads that a hole exists, then the court will
likely find that a hole exists, deem the subjective intent of the parties
irrelevant, and interpret the clause using its own interpretive principles. In
contrast, if the defendant pleads his subjective interpretation, the court will
either accept his subjective interpretation or conclude that a hole exists,
deem subjective intent irrelevant, and decide the case using its own
interpretive principles. Because (by assumption) both parties believe that
their subjective interpretation is better than the court’s interpretation, if the
plaintiff pleads that a hole exists, the defendant is better off pleading that
his subjective interpretation should govern. This response creates at least
some chance that the court will accept his preferred subjective
interpretation. Alternatively, if the plaintiff pleads her own subjective
interpretation of the clause, the defendant will reason that he is always
better off pleading his subjective interpretation than claiming that a hole
exists. If he argues for his subjective interpretation, there is at least some
possibility that the court will accept his interpretation, whereas if he pleads
a hole, the court will find either find that a hole exists or accept the
plaintiff’s subjective interpretation. Thus, regardless of the plaintiff’s
choice, the defendant is always better off arguing for his subjective
interpretation of the clause. Given this, the plaintiff too is better off arguing
for her own subjective interpretation of the clause, since doing so creates at
least some chance that her interpretation will be accepted by the court. As a
consequence, at least in the run of situations where both parties think that
the best subjective interpretation of the clause they can advance is better
than the expected interpretation the court would give the clause, they are
unlikely to avail themselves of the proposed doctrinal step even when a
hole exists. Indeed, in the NML case itself neither party asserted that the
pari passu clause was without meaning. Rather each side advanced an
argument that it meant something different.53
A. Other Directions for Reform
In sum, proposals to alter contract doctrine to respond to the black
hole problem may be difficult to implement in practice. As a consequence,

53. See, e.g., Brief of Defendant-Appellant the Republic of Argentina, NML Capital, Ltd. v.
Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 257 (2d Cir. 2012) (Nos. 12-105cv(L) et al.), 2012 WL 6777133;
Joint Response Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees NML Capital, LTD and Olifant Fund, LTD, 699 F.3d 246,
257 (2d Cir. 2012) (Nos. 12-105cv(L) et al.), 2013 WL 388621.
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to the extent that the problems revealed in the pari passu saga are widespread, it is worthwhile to explore whether there are approaches that do not
rely on the hole-or-no-hole distinction that could prove to be a more
workable response to the black hole problem.
If, for example, the inertia problem were found to exist more broadly
in particular contexts—such as markets where the contracts are closer to
the pole of financial instruments than ordinary contracts for services or the
sale of goods54—a separate article of the UCC could be added that would
apply different interpretive standards as a matter of course.55 This change
would have the advantage of eliminating the costly and uncertain black
hole inquiry.56 Nevertheless, given the well-known problems that impede
the American Law Institute (ALI) and National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) rules creation
processes, such an approach, however desirable, might also prove
infeasible.57
Alternatively, if the black hole problem turns out to be widespread in
certain types of well-defined markets or types of contracts, eliminating any
inquiry into subjective intent in those contexts would achieve most of the
benefits of the proposed black hole reform without increasing litigation
costs or the frequency of strategic behavior. Black holes aside, eschewing
the legal fiction of subjective intent in the interpretation of commercial
contracts and adopting a largely textualist plain-meaning oriented
interpretive approach is a reform that would likely prove highly beneficial
for sophisticated commercial transactors58 for reasons that have long been
54. CG&S are careful to delineate a number of reasons that the collective action problems they
observe in the sovereign debt markets where the contracts at issue—bond indentures—are in practice
closer to the pole of financial instruments, may be particularly severe compared to the collective action
problems that might or might not impede the revision of ordinary contracts for sales of goods or
provision of services when a court makes an aberrant interpretation of one of their terms. See Choi et
al., supra note 1, at 59–66.
55. The reform could take the form of a new sub-chapter of Article 2 akin to Article 2A on leases,
or an additional subset of rules in Article 2 akin to its merchant rules.
56. While such a change would raise the issue of how to decide which contracts would come
within the new Article’s purview, it could be made available to the parties on an opt-in basis at the time
of contracting, subject to rejection by a court that found the choice to be inappropriate.
57. For an overview of the problems with these private uniform law-making bodies, see generally
Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV.,
595–654 (1995). For an example of the difficulties of creating new Articles of the UCC in particular,
consider the largely failed effort to get states to adopt the Uniform Computer Information Transactions
Act, which has been adopted by only two states. See The Uniform Computer Information Transactions
Act (UCITA) Is a Proposed State Contract Law, UCITA ONLINE, http://www.ucitaonline.com/
[https://perma.cc/8SUP-W2L8] (discussing the impediments to adopting the model law).
58. The best available, though imperfect, empirical evidence suggests that sophisticated
commercial parties prefer textualist adjudication. See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Modern
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advanced by the neo-formalist school of contract interpretation.59
Indeed, the neo-formalist approach reflected in the Second Circuit’s
NML decision can be understood as taking aim at one of the causes of black
holes—namely, encrustation. According to CG&S, encrustation is the end
result of the meaningless drafting changes that lawyers introduce either
without thinking or to show their clients they are doing something. By
signaling that the court may well attach radically different meanings to
clauses with small wording differences, the approach taken by the NML
court does two key things: it increases the cost of meaningless amendments
and should therefore discourage them; and it increases the return to
meaningful amendments since the court will take them into account in
interpreting the clause which should, in turn, encourage meaningful
drafting. It can therefore be understood as an interpretive penalty default
rule that should over time change drafting behavior in ways that may
reduce the amount of meaningless encrustation in commercial agreements
and with it the likelihood that black holes will emerge.
Nevertheless, despite the potentially significant problems that black
holes may create and the many possible directions legal reform might
take,60 the current understanding of black holes may be far too limited to
Economy, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 251 (Gregory Klass, George Letsas &
Prince Saprai eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2014) (noting the common use of plain meaning clauses in large
commercial contracts providing for arbitration); Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton
Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001)
(documenting the cotton industry’s preference for a textualist/formalist adjudicative approach); see also
Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Modern Economy, supra (documenting the grain and feed industry’s
preference for a textualist/formalist legal approach); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The
Flight to New York: An Empirical Study of Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in PubliclyHeld Companies’ Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475 (2009) (demonstrating commercial actors’
strong preferences for relatively formalist New York Law); Stuart Popham, The View of European
Business: Survey Results Presentation, CLIFFORD CHANCE LLP (Mar. 14, 2008),
http://denning.law.ox.ac.uk/news/events_files/Popham_-_presentation.PPT
[https://perma.cc/DRB3KXAL] (finding that in business contracts that provided for arbitration at the International Chamber of
Commerce, transactors preferred British law, the most formalistic and textualist of the EU alternatives).
59. See generally Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, 119 YALE L.J.
926 (2010) (defending a formalist approach to contract interpretation).
60. Another potential direction for reform that could be implemented without changing the
common law, but that depends critically on the ability of groups—like state legislatures, the ALI, the
NCCUSL, trade associations, and a variety of private entities and intermediaries—to revise contractual
language when courts make errant decisions, would be to selectively adopt the reform proposals of the
legal choice theorists. See HANOCH DAGAN & MICHAEL HELLER, THE CHOICE THEORY OF CONTRACTS
102–13 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2017). These theorists explore the benefits that might accrue when
states and other private and public entities provide more “contract types” that transactors could use to
structure their affairs—much as Delaware law offers those structuring a business the option of
incorporating as a public entity, a close corporation, an LLC or a partnership. If these “types” were
carefully developed, and proved easier to change in the event of an errant judicial interpretation of their
terms than individually structured agreements, heeding the call for the creation of these types may help

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3086842

SSRN HOLES.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

12/12/17 3:43 PM

BLACK HOLE APPARITIONS

117

devise sufficiently nuanced reforms. As discussed further below, there are
reasons to question whether the saga of the pari passu, which is the
empirical foundation of CG&S’s call for immediate reform, is, on its own,
sufficient to justify the need for an immediate and generally applicable
legal response, especially given the many differences—differences CG&S
carefully delineate—between bond indentures and the other types of
contracts the proposed reform would govern.
III. IS IMMEDIATE REFORM NEEDED?
Given the many difficulties that stand in the way of a legal solution to
the black hole problem, it is important to explore whether legal reform is
really needed. The answer to this question turns, in large part, on whether
the inertia in revising contract terms after an aberrant decision interpreting
a black hole is likely to be a frequent occurrence across a variety of
markets. It also depends on whether those black holes that do emerge are
likely to be enduring phenomena or a transitory stage in the development of
the relevant market.
There is no systematic empirical evidence about the frequency of
black holes. However, the experiences of American trade associations that
created standard form contracts and trading rules to govern transactions
among their members suggest that the inertia costs that stem from
collective action problems and impede the adoption of new contract
provisions, may decrease over time as industry participants and/or market
institutions learn how to more quickly respond to the need for market-wide
contractual change.
In the textile industry, for example, the first edition of The Worth
Street Textile Trading Rules,61 which consisted of both a set of trading
rules and a standard textile sales note, took eighteen years of committee
work to draft. The rules creation process “was fraught with conflict, [and]
involved negotiations among numerous trade associations.”62 Yet once
adopted, the rules were revised and even entirely rewritten numerous times
far more quickly and with a great deal less infighting. Similarly, when the
Silk Association of America set out to create a set of trading rules for raw
solve the black hole problem in some contracting contexts. See infra notes 61–65 and accompanying
text (noting that trade associations have proved remarkably able to amend their trading rules and
standard form contracts in response to arbitral interpretations of these terms). But see Schwartz & Scott,
infra note 59 (discussing the problems that groups like the ALI have in revising their model laws).
61. See Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2’s Incorporation Strategy: A
Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 710, 730–32 (1999) (providing a short history of the Textile
Trading Rules).
62. Id. at 732.
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silk, many controversies arose. The rules-creation process took seven years
to complete because “[t]he get-together spirit was not sufficiently
pronounced to override the differences that arose . . . .”63 Nevertheless,
despite these initial difficulties, the Raw Silk Trading Rules, like the Worth
Street Rules, were subsequently amended and revised many times with far
less difficulty. A 1921 amendment, for example, was adopted after only “a
year of careful study on the part of the [rules] Committee,”64 and a 1924
amendment was adopted after mere “months of intensive effort.”65
Similarly, the National Grain and Feed Association’s effort to adopt the
first set of Grain Trading Rules was also hard-fought and filled with
disagreement. Yet since their adoption, these rules have been successfully
amended seventy-seven times, also with little infighting and only rare
controversy. The experience of these and other industries suggests that
while the initial costs of agreeing on standard contract terms and trading
rules may be high, over time these costs tend to gradually decrease as
market players and institutions get used to working with one another to
respond to technological changes, market changes, and other types of
disruptions that require market-wide changes in contractual rules or forms.
The experience of these and other groups is far from determinative;
yet it provides a reason to be cautiously optimistic that the sovereign debt
community will be able to respond more quickly in the future to any
adverse court decisions that might once again threaten to impose large
social costs on their market. There are even indications that this may
already be happening.66 The pari passu case study reveals that when key
market players first met at Columbia Law School to discuss the NML
court’s interpretation of the pari passu clause in Argentine debt, the
meeting was marked by so much “dissension and disagreement”67 that the
prospect of “any significant movement towards wholesale revision of the
clause [appeared] unlikely in the near term.”68 Nevertheless, when the
Federal Reserve convened a meeting of many of the very same people just
a few weeks later, it became clear that “everyone involved needed, and was
63. Id. at 736 (quoting SAA, THIRTY-FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT 23 (1907)).
64. Id. (quoting SAA, FORTIETH ANNUAL REPORT 31 (1912), Revision, 3 Silkworm 73 (May
1921)).
65. Id. (quoting SAA, Fifty-Third Annual Report 26 (1925)).
66. For a detailed discussion of the institutional response to the pari passu problem which
suggests that institutions “learn” each time they attempt responses, see Anna Gelpern, Ben Heller &
Brad Setser, Count the Limbs: Designing Robust Aggregation Clauses in Sovereign Bonds, in TOO
LITTLE, TOO LATE : THE QUEST TO RESOLVE SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISES (Martin Guzman, José Antonio
Ocampo & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., Columbia Univ. Press 2016).
67. Choi et al., supra note 1, at 40.
68. Id. at 39.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3086842

SSRN HOLES.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

12/12/17 3:43 PM

BLACK HOLE APPARITIONS

119

willing to, cooperate in trying to solve the systemic problem caused by the
rogue interpretation of the New York courts.”69 Legal change accelerated
shortly thereafter.70
The experience of American trade associations and the sovereign debt
community’s own response when they came together at the Federal
Reserve suggest that prudence is warranted in abstracting from the saga of
the pari passu. It is far from certain that any future errant court decisions
about the meaning of black holes in sovereign debt indentures will remain
unremedied by collective action for a significant period of time. Only time
and additional research on this and other markets will reveal whether the
saga of the pari passu is best understood as: (1) an illustration of the
transition problems that particular types of markets face when they are
confronted with the need to overcome collective action obstacles to
contractual change for the first time; (2) an enduring feature of markets
where contracts are inter-dependent in ways that make the risk of judicial
error more serious than in other markets; or (3) a problem that exists in a
wider array of contracting contexts than standard contract theory would
predict.
CONCLUSION
This Comment has explored some of the conceptual and practical
problems that make it difficult to devise an effective legal strategy for
dealing with black holes. It has also questioned whether or not a legal
response to the black hole problem is needed. Still, nothing in the
discussion has taken anything away from the core contribution of the black
hole articles—namely, the identification of a distinct type of contract
provision that poses unique interpretive challenges and may increase the
consequences of judicial error in some contracting contexts. This
contribution is particularly timely because black holes are likely to become
increasingly common as a result of a number of technological changes that
facilitate the creation of complex agreements with largely standardized yet
slightly variant terms.71
69. Id. at 40.
70. However, as CG&S point out, these revisions occurred only in sovereign debt—not quasisovereign debt—which in their view left the market facing significant social costs. Id. at 24–25.
71. See, e.g., KMSTANDARDS (2016), KMstandards.com [https://perma.cc/5KTY-Z2NJ]; IACCM
(2017), IACCM.com [https://perma.cc/YH8G-8D73] (providing contract drafting software that permits
the quick and inexpensive drafting of largely standard form contracts while giving transactors a variety
of clauses to choose from), the website of the International Association of Contract and Commercial
Managers [https://perma.cc/KKP7-3SMZ] (containing information about new contract drafting
technologies).
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Nevertheless, until more is known about black holes in both the
sovereign debt market and other contexts it might be best to refrain from
undertaking any general doctrinal legal reforms in response to the
phenomenon, especially as the type and magnitude of the problems caused
by black holes are likely to be vastly different depending on the market in
question.
Moreover, the cost of not responding to the problem may be far lower
than it seems. The interpretive approach adopted by the Second Circuit in
NML v. Argentina may turn out to be the best or at least a passably good
long-run common law response to the black hole problem—especially in
markets where the players (individuals, governments, and institutions) are
sophisticated and are advised by able counsel. By functioning as an
interpretive penalty default rule,72 the Second Circuit’s adjudicative
approach creates incentives for transactors and market intermediaries like
rating agencies to pay more attention to drafting choices. It may also have
the beneficial effect of encouraging new or existing market or quasigovernmental intermediaries to develop the institutional frameworks
needed to provide the types of tailored responses to contracting problems
that the common law cannot provide without introducing changes that will
be vastly over- or underinclusive and will also be likely to increase both
litigation costs and the incidence of strategic behavior.
Interestingly, while CG&S remain critical of the NML decision, they
now acknowledge that some type of institutional response (whether
induced by the common law or encouraged by other types of government
action) may, at the end of the day, be the best response to the black hole
problem in the long-run. As they explain in reference to the interchange of
ideas that led to this Comment:
the true lesson of our study may be that the IMF and other groups that
constitute the ‘official sector’ may be better able than courts to solve these
problems over time as they gain experience and become more confident in
their methods. If this is so, then even though the pari passu case shows
that the intervention of a public authority is sometimes required to solve
contractual disputes that have third-party effects, relying on the courts
rather than private ordering to craft the solution may not always be the
best choice.73

72. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91–130 (1989) (describing the theory of the penalty default rule).
73. Choi et al., supra note 1, at 69–70 (citing discussions with Bernstein).
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